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I. INTRODUCTION
A witness (W) is called before a federal grand jury. Asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination,' W refuses to answer questions.
The government then moves to grant W immunity. W is granted
immunity and is ordered to testify, but still refuses to answer, asserting
that the questions asked are based on the results of illegal electronic
surveillance. 2 The government seeks to have W held in contempt. 3 At
the contempt hearing W argues that the illegal surveillance provides
him with "just cause" for refusing to answer. This hypothetical, but
not uncommon, factual situation raises three questions which have
been the subject of much litigation in recent years: (1) Does the illegal
surveillance provide W with "just cause" for refusing to answer the
questions of the grand jury? (2) If question (1) is answered
* Member, Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
** Articles & Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1970) for the statutory provisions governing the interception of
oral communications.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970):
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of
the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court
to testify or provide other information . . . the court, upon such refusal, or when such
refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a
suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide
such information.
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affirmatively, how can W effectively assert the defense of the illegal
electronic surveillance? (3) Once W has made a prima facie showing of
illegal surveillance, what is the government's required response?
Only the answer to question (1) has been definitively resolved.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Gelbard v. United States,
4
held that a showing that the interrogation of a witness is based on the
illegal interception of his communications constitutes "just cause" for
his refusing to testify and precludes finding him in contempt within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. section 1826(a). 5 The law regarding the two
remaining questions, however, is fraught with confusion. The thrust of
this article is an analysis of these two issues of law. It is hoped that the
alternatives presented will be of valuable assistance to theoreticians
and practitioners alike. Prior to an examination of these issues, how-
ever, it is necessary to evaluate the Gelbard decision and its statutory
basis, both of which have set the tenor for recent litigation.
It should be noted that in the context of this article the witness is
not moving to suppress the evidence before the grand jury. He is
merely attempting to raise illegal electronic surveillance as a defense to
a contempt charge arising out of his refusal to testify. In the recent
case of Calandra v. United States,6 the Supreme Court, in holding the
exclusionary rule not applicable to grand jury proceedings, made clear
that a witness does not have standing to allege a fourth amendment
violation of his right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.
The Calandra majority expressly indicated that its decision did not
modify or reverse the Gelbard holding. 7 This position was reiterated
recently by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, when it stated
that even though a witness has no standing to move to suppress, this
"does not, the Court held in Gelbard, mean that the witness, faced
with contempt proceedings, cannot invoke the provisions of section
2515.
"18
II. GELBARD V. UNITED STATES
A. The Decision
The Gelbard case was a consolidation of three court of appeals
decisions. 9 Each case involved a witness' refusal to obey an order to
testify before a federal grand jury on the ground that the -questions
were based upon information derived from allegedly illegal electronic
surveillance. The Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of the appeal,
4. 408 U.S. 41 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Gelbard].
5. See note 3 supra.
6. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Calandra].
7. Id. at 623 n.11.
8. In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901, 903 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94 S.
Ct. 3064 (1974).
9. In re Walsh, 450 F.2d 231 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Gelbard, 443 F.2d 837 (9th
Cir. 1971); and In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971).
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that the taps were illegal and, thus, disclosure of their "fruits" was
prohibited by 18 U.S.C. section 2515.10 The Court's holding that a
grand jury witness may invoke the prohibition of section 2515 when
the government seeks to have him adjudicated in contempt was based
on the express wording of the statute and on what the court deemed to
be the legislative intent of the Act. In addition, the Court relied upon
18 U.S.C. section 3504(a)(1),'' which
is explicit confirmation that Congress intended that grand
jury witnesses, in reliance upon the prohibition of § 2515,
might refuse to answer questions based upon the illegal inter-
ception of their communications.
1 2
The government contended that section 3504 did not confer stand-
ing on a grand jury witness to challenge the legality of a wiretap, as it
merely provided a procedure to be followed where a witness had
standing independent of that section. Accordingly, the government
argued that 18 U.S.C. section 2518(10)(a) 13 confers standing to move
to suppress evidence only in enumerated circumstances and noted that
grand jury proceedings were not included in the enumeration. The
Court, in response, correctly distinguished the situation in which one
seeks to suppress evidence before a grand jury from that in which the
witness who has refused to testify is faced with incarceration for
contempt. The rule that a defendant cannot challenge his indictment
on the grounds that the evidence received by the grand jury would not
be admissible in court,' 4 "has nothing whatever to do with the situa-
tion of a grand jury witness who has refused to testify and who
attempts to defend a subsequent charge of contempt."'
10. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970) provides that:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted, no part of the contents
of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence
in any . . . proceeding in or before any . . .grand jury . . . if the disclosure of that
information would be in violation of this chapter.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a) (1970) provides that:
In any . . . proceeding in or before any . . . grand jury of the United States-
(i) upon a claim by a party aggrieved that evidence is inadmissible because it is the
primary product of an unlawful act or because it was obtained by the exploitation of an
unlawful act, the opponent of the claim shall affirm or deny the occurrence of the
alleged unlawful act . ...
12. 408 U.S. at 52.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10) (a) (1970) provides that:
Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States, a
State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move to suppress the contents of any
intercepted wire or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds
that-
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient
on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or
approval.
14. See, e.g., Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (grand jury considered evidence
obtained in violation of defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (an indictment is not defective because the grand jury considered
hearsay evidence).
15. 408 U.S. at 60.
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Several facets of the Gelbard decision are of particular impor-
tance. In the first instance, the Court failed to discuss a constitutional
foundation-the fourth amendment-upon which to base its holding. 16
The decision was based primarily on construction of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968 section 802.17 The
Court quoted the Senate Report 8 to the effect that it is essential that
the victim of illegal surveillance not be left without a remedy. "The
perpetrator must be denied the fruits of his unlawful actions in civil
and criminal proceedings."19
Section 2515 is thus central to the legislative scheme. Its
importance as a protection for "the victim of an unlawful
invasion of privacy" could not be more clear. The purposes of
§ 2515 and Title III as a whole would be subverted were the
plain command of § 2515 ignored when the victim of an
illegal interception is called as a witness before a grand jury
and asked questions based upon that interception.
20
Secondly, despite its extensive analysis of the reasons for permit-
ting a grand jury witness to raise an illegal wiretap as a defense in
contempt proceedings, the Court only dealt tangentially with the issue
of the specificity of the witness' illegal wiretap allegations. In its
discussion of section 3504, the Court stated:
In the application of § 3504 to "any . . . proceeding in or
before . . . any grand jury," "a party aggrieved" can only be
a witness, for there is no other "party" to a grand jury
proceeding. Morever, a "claim . . . that evidence is inadmis-
sible" can only be a claim that the witness' potential tes-
timony is inadmissible.
2 1
This language emphasizes the Court's view that section 2515 is a
defense to a contempt charge. Other than the statutory quotation
dealing with the word "claim" and the literal meaning of that word,
there is virtually no enunciation by the Court on the issue of the
specificity of the witness' allegations.
Finally, the Court did not deal directly with the question of the
necessary specificity of the government's response. The Court stated:
Upon such a claim by a grand jury witness, the Government,
as "the opponent of the claim," is required under § 3504(a)(1)
to "affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged" illegal
interception. 22
Here again, the main thrust of this assertion was to support the
16. Id. at 62 (Douglas, J., concurring).
17. 82 Stat. 211, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
18. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968).
19. 408 U.S. at 50, quoting S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1968) (emphasis in
original).
20. 408 U.S. at 50-51 (1972) (footnote omitted).
21. Id. at 54.
22. Id. at 54-55.
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Court's holding that a witness may invoke the prohibition of section
2515 as a defense to a contempt charge. The majority opinion did not
consider the questions of (1) whether the government need only deny
the existence of an illegal tap, (2) whether the government must submit
affidavits of a diligent inquiry to determine that there was no illegal
tap, or (3) whether a plenary hearing must be held on the legality of
any interception.
Justice White, in his concurring opinion, rejected any possible
contention that a witness is entitled to a "full blown" suppression
hearing. "[W]here the Government officially denies the fact of elec-
tronic surveillance of the witness, the matter is at an end and the
witness must answer." '2 3 Mr. Justice White's opinion, however, dealt
only with those situations where the government denies the existence
of any wiretap or admits a wiretap and produces a court order au-
thorizing the tap. In such situations, according to Justice White, the
witness is not entitled to a suppression hearing to test the legality of
the order.
Suppression hearings in these circumstances would result in
protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings. . . . and,
in any event, the deterrent value of excluding the evidence
will be marginal at best.
2 4
Justice White's opinion, though raising several of the questions that
have been the focal point of extensive litigation and of section IV of
this article, did not deal with situations where there was no court
order, where the authorizing order was not in conformity with the
statute, or where the order authorizing the wiretap was not based on
probable cause.
In summary, Gelbard merely held that a grand jury witness who
has refused to obey a court order to testify may assert the prohibition
of section 2515 as a defense when the government seeks to have him
held in contempt.
B. The Statutory Basis
The central issues raised when an immunized grand jury witness
refuses to obey a court order to testify revolve around three statutes: 18
U.S.C. section 2515,25 18 U.S.C. section 2518(10Xa) 26 and 18 U.S.C.
section 3504(a)(1). 27 There are two primary purposes of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control Act: (1) to protect individual privacy and (2)
to delineate when wiretaps may be employed and when the fruits of
the surveillance may be used in evidence.2 8
23. Id. at 71 (White, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
25. See note 10 supra.
26. See note 13 supra.
27. See note 11 supra.
28. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong,, 2d Sess. 66 (1968).
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Section 2515 is the exclusionary provision of the law, and, as the
Supreme Court made clear in Gelbard, is central to the entire statutory
scheme.
The provision thus forms an integral part of the system of
limitations designed to protect privacy. Along with the crimi-
nal and civil remedies, it should serve to guarantee that the
standards of the new chapter will sharply curtail the unlaw-
ful interception of wire and oral communications.
29
Although section 2515 is a general exclusionary rule, its evidentiary
sanctions must be read in conjunction with section 2518(10)(a).3 °
According to the Senate Report, section 2518(10)(a) provides the
remedy for the right created by section 2515. 3 1 Section 2518(10Xa),
however, omits grand jury proceedings from those hearings in which a
motion to suppress may be entertained.
Because no person is a party as such to a grand jury proceed-
ing, the provision does not envision the making of a motion
to suppress in the context of such a proceeding itself .... It is
the intent of the provision only that when a motion to sup-
press is granted in another context, its scope may include use
in a future grand jury proceeding. 3 2
Although section 2518(10)(a) forecloses the right of a grand jury
witness to make a motion to suppress at the grand jury proceedings, as
the Supreme Court stated in Gelbard,
[I]t does not follow from the asserted omission of grand jury
proceedings from the suppression provision that grand jury
witnesses cannot invoke § 2515 as a defense in a contempt
proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 1826.
33
Therefore, at the hearing on contempt which is required under rule
42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 34 the alleged con-
29. Id. at 96.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 106.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. 408 U.S. at 59 (footnote omitted).
34. The question of whether rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is
applicable to contempt proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1826 (1970) is not entirely clear.
Most of the doubt has arisen from two Supreme Court cases. In the first, Harris v. United States,
382 U.S. 162 (1965), the Court held that where an individual is sentenced to jail for a stated
period of time for refusing to obey a court order to testify, his contempt is criminal contempt. The
next year in Shilitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), the Court held that where the
contempt may be cured by testifying, the contempt is civil in nature. These cases, however, dealt
with whether or not a contemnor was entitled to a jury trial and not whether rule 42(b) was
applicable. Thus, the distinction between civil and criminal contempt is based on the purpose of
the incarceration. If the incarceration is punitive, the contempt is criminal. If the incarceration is
coercive and the witness may cure his contempt by- testifying, the contempt is civil. Unfortu-
nately, the Court in Shillitani did not refer to Harris. Faced with this problem, the Ninth
Circuit, in United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973), held that a contempt proceeding
where the witness is given the opportunity to cure his contempt is sufficiently civil in character to
foreclose the alleged contemnor's right to a jury trial, but sufficiently crihninal in character to
require a hearing under rule 42(b). The Second Circuit in the case of In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156
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temnor may invoke the prohibition of section 2515. This appears to be
a proper reading of the legislative intent. As the Senate Report indi-
cates, where a motion to suppress is granted in "another context," the
motion is applicable to any future grand jury proceedings. 35 In the
hypothetical factual situation with which this article commenced, the
hearing on the alleged contempt, it is submitted, serves as the other
context, envisioned by Congress. Section 2518(10)(a), in effect, indi-
cates the basis of the defense which a witness charged with contempt
may raise when information is obtained by illegal wiretaps.
36
Once it is clear that the grand jury witness has standing to raise
an illegal wiretap as a defense to a charge of contempt, the questions
then become: (1) how does the witness assert the defense; and (2) how
does the government meet the defense. Section 3504(a)(1) of Title 18 of
the United States Code is designed to provide guidance in this area.
Although the full import of section 3504 is still open to question, it is
clear that
[u]nder this provision, upon a charge by the defendant with
standing to challenge the alleged unlawful conduct, the Gov-
ernment would be required to affirm or deny that an unlaw-
ful act involving electronic surveillance had in fact
occurred.
37
The vital language of this House Report quotation is "upon a charge
by the defendant . . . the Government would be required to affirm or
deny . . . ." The crucial issues that are thereby raised involve the
requisite specificity both of the alleged contemnor's allegations and of
the government's response.
III. STANDING AND SPECIFICITY OF THE
WITNESS' ALLEGATIONS
A. Who Has Standing to Raise the Defense of an Illegal
Electronic Surveillance?
The legislative history of Title III indicates that it was not the
intent of Congress to alter traditional standing requirements. 38 Title
III to a large extent codifies the fourth amendment exclusionary rule in
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1554 (1974), rejected this approach and held that where the
contempt is civil, rule 42(b) is not applicable. However, regardless of whether the hearing is held
pursuant to rule 42(b) or not, it is quite clear that the defense of an illegal wiretap is available to
the witness in contempt proceedings initiated under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970).
35. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
36. See In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94
S. Ct. 3064 (1974).
37. H. R. REP. No. 91-1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1970).
38. See In re Womack, 466 F.2d 555, 558 (7th Cir. 1972):
We can only conclude that neither Congress in the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act or in the Organized Crime Control Act nor the Supreme Court in Gelbard
intended to overrule or change the constitutional rule of Alderman that only the person
whose privacy is invaded by an illegal electronic surveillance has standing to object.
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its application to intercepted communications, and, in fact, 18 U.S.C.
section 2518(10)(a)(i) has been held to preserve all constitutional
claims.3 9 Standing to suppress the product of a fourth amendment
violation
can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were
violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved
solely by the introduction of damaging evidence.
40
This standing criterion particularly applies to wiretap situations, as a
person is
entitled to the suppression of government evidence originat-
ing in electronic surveillance violative of his own Fourth
Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and
seizures. Such violation would occur if the United States
unlawfully overheard conversations of a petitioner [witness]
himself or conversations occurring on his premises, whether
or not he was present or participated in those conversa-
tions.41
Despite this language, prior to Gelbard, the courts of appeals were in
conflict as to whether a grand jury witness had standing to assert the
existence of an illegal tap when the government sought to have him
adjudicated in contempt. 4 2 Gelbard resolved the issue in favor of the
alleged contemnor.
Since a witness has standing to assert this defense at a contempt
proceeding, the issue has arisen as to whether the witness' standing
privilege is limited to wiretaps of his conversations alone and those
occurring on his premises. Several courts of appeals have gone beyond
Gelbard and held that a grand jury witness has standing, under certain
conditions, to assert the illegal surveillance of his attorney as a defense
to contempt. 4 3 In accordance with Alderman, however, it has been
held that a witness may not "press a claim that her questioning was
the result of leads obtained by illegal taps on someone else." ' 4 4
Perhaps more importantly, as the court held in Cali v. United
States,4 5 "whatever rights a witness may have in a defense to a
contempt proceeding, he may not anticipate such a proceeding by
bringing a motion to suppress evidence before the grand jury." The
holding of the First Circuit in Cali, was reinforced by the Supreme
39. In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901, 903 (1st Cir.), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94
S. Ct. 3064 (1974).
40. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1968) [hereinafter referred to as
Alderman].
41. Id. at 176.
42. Compare Reed v. United States, 448 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
922 (1972) and In re Russo, 448 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1971) with In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972).
43. See United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973); Beverly v. United States, 468
F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
44. United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466, 468 (1st Cir. 1971).
45. 464 F.2d 475, 478-79 (1st Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Cali].
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Court decision in United States v. Calandra.46 Although Calandra did
not deal with electronic surveillance, as did Cali, its holding was that a
grand jury witness may not move to suppress evidence which is the
basis of the questions asked by the grand jury. For future cases the
Court undoubtedly would follow this decision when, at a grand jury
proceeding, a witness seeks to suppress evidence on the basis of a
wiretap. The four Justices dissenting in Gelbard formed the basis of
the Calandra majority. They were joined by Justice White whose
concurring opinion in Gelbard47 indicates that he would certainly hold
that a grand jury witness has no standing in a grand jury proceeding
to move to suppress evidence derived from an illegal wiretap.
The Court in Calandra based its holding primarily on the belief
that, since the purpose of the grand jury is to inquire, it should not be
bound by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules which govern
criminal trials. The Court weighed the necessity of unimpeded grand
jury investigations against the threat to the individual and found that,
in the context of a grand jury proceeding, the rationale for excluding
illegally obtained evidence did not apply. The arguments for the
exclusionary rule "are strongest where the Government's unlawful
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the victim
of the search."'48 Since the grand jury does not adjudicate guilt or
innocence and the witness is free to press his claim at trial if he is
indicted, the need for unimpeded investigation is paramount.
Any holding that would saddle the grand jury with mini-
trials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its
investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and
expeditious administration of the criminal laws.
49
It is, thus, clear that a grand jury witness may not move to suppress
evidence before the grand jury under either the fourth amendment or
18 U.S.C. section 2518(10)(a). However, it is equally clear that a grand
jury witness may assert the illegal electronic surveillance of himself or
his counsel, but not an outsider, as a defense when the government
seeks to have him adjudicated in contempt for failure to obey a court
order to testify.
B. The Required Specificity of the Witness' Allegations
The language of 18 U.S.C. section 3504(a)(1) leaves no doubt that
a claim of electronic surveillance by the witness, with the requisite
specificity, shifts the burden to the government to affirm or deny the
existence of an illegal tap. 50 The present "majority" view appears to be
that the mere allegation in good faith by the witness will trigger the
46. 94 S. Ct. 613 (1974).
47. See notes 23 and 24 supra and accompanying text.
48. United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613, 620 (1974).
49. Id. at 621, quoting United States v. Dionsio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
50. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 56 (1972).
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applicability of section 3504(a)(1) where the alleged tap has been of the
witness himself.
The leading case in this area is In re Evans,5 1 a pre-Gelbard case.
In Evans, the court stated,
Since 3504(a)(1) is triggered, in our view, by the mere asser-
tion that unlawful wiretapping has been used against a party,
the government must make the next move if it still wishes to
interrogate these appellants. 
5 2
The rationale for this holding is apparent: since an effective electronic
surveillance necessitates concealment, the victim ordinarily will re-
main virtually unaware of the details concerning the illegal taps. If a
witness, therefore, were required to specify in great detail the facts
giving rise to his belief that he had been the subject of surveillance, an
intolerable burden would be imposed on him. Conversely, the re-
quirement that the government affirm or deny the existence of an
illegal tap imposes only a minimal, additional burden on the govern-
ment, as the government is, or should be, possessed of all pertinent
records. In any event, if the government were required only to affirm
or deny the existence of the surveillance when the witness has asserted
in great detail the specific facts, a significant invasion of the witness'
privacy may occur through the revelation of these facts. The Evans
view, that section 3504(a)(1) is triggered merely by the witness' claim
of an illegal surveillance, is predicated largely on that court's percep-
tion of the Congressional intent
to combine a limited and carefully articulated grant of power
to intercept communications with an elaborate set of
safeguards to deter abuse and to expunge its effects in the
event that it should occur.
53
To require a great amount of specificity in the witness' statement
would have the counter-productive effect of enabling the government
to violate the wiretap law without fear of suppression of the evidence,
because in very few situations could a witness meet the threshold
specificity requirements.
The Evans view has been followed recently by the Second5 4 and
Ninth5 5 Circuits. The holding that the mere good faith assertion of an
illegal or allegedly illegal wiretap triggers section 3504(a)(1), "adopts
the ordinary meaning of the language of the statute predicating the
government's obligation to affirm or deny upon a simple 'claim' of
inadmissibility. '56 The affidavit in United States v. Vielguth merely
51. 452 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 930 (1972) [hereinafter referred to
as Evans].
52. Id. at 1247.
53. Id. at 1243.
54. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
55. United States v. Vielguth, 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974).
56. Id. at 1258.
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stated that the witness believed that the questions were based on
information which could have been obtained only by illegal electronic
surveillance. The affidavit then proceeded to identify the telephone
numbers, the premises, and the periods of time involved in the alleged
surveillance. The court found that the affidavit was "sufficient to
require the government to affirm or deny the occurrence of the alleged
surveillance. 57
This rule comports with both the realities of the situation and the
ordinary meaning of the statutory language. It is especially vital that
section 3504(a)(1) be invoked upon a mere good faith assertion of
illegal surveillance in light of the ever increasing sophistication of
surveillance devices. The argument, that to require the government to
"affirm or deny" upon a mere good faith assertion by the witness
would impose an intolerable burden on the government, loses its
persuasive power when a realistic approach to the government's re-
sponse is established.5 8 Moreover, in all probability, section 3504(a)(1)
has lessened the burden on the government.
Subsection (a)(1) [of section 3504] was added at the suggestion
of the Department of Justice at the time the Department
followed the practice of searching Government files for in-
formation about wiretaps and eavesdropping. The Depart-
ment advised the Senate Judiciary Committee that while it
had been "conclud[ing] such examinations as a matter of
policy even in cases when no motion ha[d] been filed . . .
defendants should be assured such an examination by a
specific requirement of law rather than hav[ing] to rely upon
the continued validity of current policy." The Senate report
on § 3504 explained that since [subsection (a)(1)] requires a
pending claim as a predicate to disclosure, it sets aside the
wasteful practice of the Department of Justice in searching
files without a motion from a defendant.
59
In situations where the conversations overheard involve the wit-
ness' attorney, and not the witness himself, a different standard of
specificity of the witness' allegations may be employed by the courts.
As discussed previously, 60 a grand jury witness may raise the defense
of illegal surveillance of his attorney when the government seeks to
have him adjudicated in contempt. Standing is conferred when the
surveillance of the attorney intercepts conversations, "relevant to his
representation of the particular client in the matter at hand ....1,,61
Because the defense is available only when the conversation overheard
is relevant to the attorney's representation of the alleged contemnor, it
57. Id. at 1261.
58. See section IV infra.
59. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 56 (1972).
60. See note 43 supra and accompanying text.
61. United States v. Veilguth, 502 F.2d. 1257, 1260 (9th Cir. 1974).
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is arguable that a greater degree of specificity and detail is required to
trigger section 3504(a)(1) surveillance of counsel cases.
Indeed, in United States v. Alter, 62 the court held that a mere
assertion of unlawful surveillance of one's counsel was insufficient to
require the government to affirm or deny the allegation. The court
determined that to establish a prima facie case of electronic surveil-
lance of counsel the affidavit(s) or other evidence in support of the
claim must reveal the following:
(1) the specific facts which reasonably lead the affiant to
believe that named counsel for the named witness has been
subjected to electronic surveillance;
(2) the dates of such suspected surveillance;
(3) the outside dates of representation of the witness by the
lawyer during the period of surveillance;
(4) the identity of the person(s) by name or description, to-
gether with their respective telephone numbers, with whom
the lawyer (or his agents or employees) was communicating at
the time the claimed surveillance took place; and
(5) facts showing some connection between possible elec-
tronic surveillance and the grand jury witness who asserts the
claim or the grand jury proceeding in which the witness is
involved.
63
In explaining its position in Alter, the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Vielguth6 4 stated:
The possibility that surveillance of conversations of the wit-
ness' attorney with third persons may impinge upon the wit-
ness' Sixth Amendment rights is of an entirely different order
than the possibility that such surveillance of the witness' own
conversations may have violated the witness' statutory and
constitutional rights of privacy. The witness' Sixth Amend-
ment rights can be implicated only if the attorney's conversa-
tions are relevant to his representation of the particular client
in the matter at hand, in which case the witness has standing
to require an affirmance or denial. The additional showing
required by Alter is directed at establishing the possibility
that electronic surveillance of an attorney's conversations
with third persons might fall into this category. These addi-
tional requirements may be justified not only because there is
a much greater possibility that the claim of electronic surveil-
lance of relevant third-party conversations will prove to be
ill-founded, but also because disclosure of such third-party
conversations would invade the privacy of additional
persons. 65
62. 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Alter].
63. Id. at 1026.
64. 502 F.2d 1257 (9th Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 1260 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the Alter requirements
in light of their objectives as announced by the same court in Vielguth.
The Alter requirements pose an unwarranted burden on the witness
asserting the defense of illegal surveillance of counsel in light of the
objectives stated above. As a preliminary observation, it should be
noted that if -a witness has standing to raise the illegal surveillance of
counsel as "just cause" for refusing to testify, it is essential to permit
him to require the government to "affirm or deny" after he has made a
reasonable showing of a surveillance.
One of the goals of the Alter requirements of specificity is to
increase the probabilities that the alleged surveillance of counsel con-
cerned matters relevant to counsel's representation of the witness.
66
However, requirement (1), that the witness aver the specific facts
giving rise to his belief that counsel has been subjected to surveillance
does not further this goal. In fact, its sole result is to decrease the
possibility that a witness charged with contempt will be able to require
the government to affirm or deny the surveillance of counsel. A second
goal of the Alter specificity requirements is to decrease the invasion of
privacy of third parties. The fourth of the Alter requirements, 6 7 how-
ever, requires the witness to specify all those with whom his attorney
has spoken during the alleged surveillance period. Through the revela-
tion of names of parties and their telephone numbers, this requirement
cannot reasonably co-exist with the court's expressed intention to avoid
a significant infringement of the privacy of third persons.
The decision of the Fifth Circuit in Beverly v. United States68
adopts a more realistic view while still satisfying the primary goal that,
before the illegal surveillance of counsel may be a defense to contempt,
it must be shown that the surveillance was relevant to counsel's
representation of the witness. Beverly requires that the affidavit of the
witness show: (1) the name of counsel; (2) the dates of representation
and suspected surveillance; (3) the name of the witness represented;
and (4) the telephone numbers. 69 The showing is similar to that re-
quired in Evans and Vielguth. However, the court has added the
requirement that the dates of representation be shown in the affidavit.
The logic of this additional requirement is obvious; if counsel were
subject to electronic surveillance during his representation of the wit-
ness, at some point in this period conversations relevant to the witness
were overheard. The showing required by Beverly, therefore, assures
relevance, while at the same time avoids a substantial invasion of any
third-party's privacy, 70 and also affords the witness the ability to
66. Id.
67. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
68. 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Beverly].
69. Id. at 752.
70. Compare note 69 supra and accompanying text with note 63 supra and accompanying
text. The Beverly requirements are far less stringent than those espoused in Alter. Beverly, for
instance, does not require: (1) the revelation of the names of the persons who communicated with
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trigger section 3504(a)(1) upon a reasonable showing of illegal surveil-
lance. Beverly also adopts the realistic view, that in determining the
sufficiency of the witness' allegations, the district courts will play a
paramount role:
The district court will have wide latitude in determining the
sufficiency and objectivity of factual allegations brought forth
on a basis for claims of unlawful attorney surveillance. There
is room for balance between due regard for the witness'
constitutional rights as protected by the statute, on the one
hand, and the rights of the United States to proceed with
reasonable promptness with a grand jury investigation on the
other. 7
Assuming that the witness makes the requisite showing to require
the government to "affirm or deny" the existence of the alleged illegal
tap, the degree of specificity of the witness' allegation may have an
important bearing on the court's determination of the sufficiency of the
government's response.
In the Evans case, the court concluded that:
Thus if the government now denies the existence of any
wiretapping against appellants, they will presumably lose
their statutory privilege to remain silent. Whether under such
circumstances a witness should be permitted to traverse the
government's statement, or whether a witness should be able
to shift the burden of going forward back to the government
by making some showing to contradict the government's as-
sertion, are questions with great potential impact .... 71
Although the Evans court specifically dealt with only a possible chal-
lenge by the witness to the government's denial, by implication it
alluded to the question of whether specific allegations in great detail by
a witness might require a more substantial response by the govern-
ment. The question was raised by the Ninth Circuit in United States
v. Fitch, 73 where the court, in dealing with the alleged surveillance of
counsel, held that the government's response by affidavit was
sufficient, but indicated that a more concrete and specific allegation of
wiretapping might require a more elaborate response. This issue will
be examined more extensively below; however, it should be men-
tioned, that a balancing test requiring a greater response by the gov-
ernmefnt, where the witness makes specific and extensive factual alle-
gations as to a government wiretap, certainly appeals to a sense of
justice and equity and is in line with the policy of Title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, as expressed in the
Legislative History.
the attorney, or (2) a statement of the specific facts which led the witness to believe that his
counsel was subjected to surveillance.
71. 468 F.2d at 752.
72. In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
73. 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1973).
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IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S REQUIRED RESPONSE
A. The Simplest Case-The Government Neither Admits
Nor Denies
The Supreme Court decision in Gelbard leaves no doubt that
when the government seeks to hold a grand jury witness in contempt,
he has standing to challenge the propriety of the grand jury interroga-
tion on the ground that such interrogation is based upon the prior
illegal interception of the witness' communications. 74 The Supreme
Court stressed that such a witness may invoke the procedure pre-
scribed in 18 U.S.C. section 3504(a)(1) by claiming that his testimony
is inadmissible because it is the primary product of an unlawful act,
namely an illegal interception, or because it was obtained by the
exploitation of such an unlawful act. As provided in section 3504(a)(1),
where a witness invokes such a procedure, it becomes the duty of the
opponent of the claim (the government) to affirm or deny the occur-
rence of the alleged unlawful act.
75
In Bacon v. United States, 76 the witness substantially followed
this procedure during grand jury proceedings by filing a motion alleg-
ing that there had been illegal interceptions and requesting a hearing
to ascertain the facts. Instead of responding by affirming or denying
the occurrence of this alleged unlawful act, 77 the government opposed
the witness' motion. The court stated:
Had the Government made the required response, and had
such response indicated that there had been prior electronic
surveillance of [the witness'] communications, then she would
have been entitled to a hearing of the kind prescribed in
Alderman v. United States . . . altered to conform to the
provisions of section 3504(a)(2) and (3), as noted in Gelbard
v. United States ....
Since the Government did not follow the procedure pre-
scribed in section 3504(a)(1) [the witness] was entitled to
refuse to give further grand jury testimony.
78
The form of the government's required response was at issue in
Korman v. United States.79 In that case the defendant-witnesses al-
leged that the refusal of the Solicitor General to answer their inquiries
with respect to the utilization of electronic surveillance in gathering
information for the grand jury justified the witness' belief that they
had, in fact, been so subjected. 80 The United States Department of
74. 408 U.S. at 41.
75. See note 11 supra.
76. 466 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1972).
77. This is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1973).
78. Bacon v. United States, 466 F.2d 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1972).
79. 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973).
80. In the Motion for Production of Reports of Electronic Surveillance the petitioners
asserted on the authority of Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S. Ct. 2357, 33
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Justice filed a letter from Henry E. Petersen, Assistance Attorney
General, to Sheldon Davidson of the Chicago Strike Force denying
that conversations of the witnesses had been overheard by the De-
partment of Justice by means of electronic surveillance. The letter
concluded with a statement that the witnesses had never been sub-
jected to electronic surveillance by the United States Secret Service,
the United States Postal Service, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, or the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.
The Seventh Circuit stated that in the past "[c]ertain indiscretions
have been revealed concerning illegal electronic surveillance which
seem to militate for a more formal and binding denial ... "81 The
court then held that an official government denial of electronic surveil-
lance must at the very least be submitted in the form of an affidavit by
a responsible government official. 8 2
However, even in those instances where the government has filed
an affidavit in response to an allegation of illegal electronic surveil-
lance, the affidavit may be inadequate and thereby fail to satisfy the
minimum requirements of 18 U.S.C. section 3504(a)(1). Such an
affidavit is "no response."
The court so held in United States v. Alter.8 3 There, a grand jury
witness submitted affidavits in support of his claim that he and his
lawyer had been subjected to illegal surveillance. In answer to the
witness' affidavits, the government filed a form affidavit signed by
Special Attorney Dierker.8 4 The grand jury witness challenged the
L.Ed.2d 179 (1972) that as grand jury witnesses, they were entitled to invoke the
statutory prohibition against use before the grand jury of evidence gleaned from inter-
ception of any wire or oral communications.
Id. at 928 n.3.
81. Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926, 931 (7th Cir. 1973).
82. Various circuits have considered the adequacy of an affidavit of denial in similar cases.
and have deemed the affidavit sufficient as an official denial. E.g., United States v. Fitch, 472
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1973); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972); In re Grumbles,
453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971).
83. 482 F.2d 1016 (9th Cir. 1973).
84. The affidavit stated:
ROBERT A. DIERKER being first duly sworn states:
1. That I am an attorney with the United States Department of Justice, Internal
Security Division, temporarily assigned to assist the United States Attorney for the
Northern District of California, and I am authorized to represent the Government in
grand jury investigations and judicial proceedings ancillary thereto;
2. That I caused an official inquiry to be made with the appropriate Federal
Government agencies to determine if there has been any electronic surveillance of the
conversations of MARK LAWRENCE ALTER. The federal agencies to whom this inquiry
was directed are:
a. Federal Bureau of Investigation
b. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
c. United States Secret Service
d. Internal Revenue Service
e. Bureau of Customs
f. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
g. United States Postal Service;
3. That based upon the results of the said inquiry I state that there has been no
electronic surveillance occurring on premises known to have been owned, leased, or
licensed by the said MARK LAWRENCE ALTER;
4. I further state that based upon the said inquiry there has been no electronic
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legal sufficiency of the affidavit on three grounds: (1) the critical
statements were conclusions based on multiple hearsay, (2) the agen-
cies checked were too limited, and (3) the affidavit did not reveal the
period covered by the investigation.
The court held that the witness' affidavits were sufficiently con-
crete and specific to make a prima facie showing that on the occasions
described someone was interfering with his telephone calls and that the
FBI was involved. "The burden was then on the Government squarely
to affirm or to deny those charges . . . .The Dierker affidavit did
neither. "85
The court's decision was grounded on the fact that the Dierker
affidavit spoke in conclusory terms; no information whatever was
supplied about the identity of the person or persons with whom
Dierker communicated, the substance of his inquiries, or the substance
of the replies. The affidavit stated no facts from which the court could
conclude that the six agencies listed were the only governmental agen-
cies that could have been involved in electronic surveillance. Nor did
the affidavit reveal the dates of the claimed surveillance to which the
inquiries were addressed. 86 To reply sufficiently, the government must
file a responsive, factual, unambiguous and unequivocal affidavit. 87
In summary, it is clear that the government must respond by
affirming or denying a witness' allegations that he has been subjected
to illegal electronic surveillance. The failure of the government to do
so will preclude a finding of contempt pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section
182 6(a).
B. The Government Admits
Once the government has admitted the existence of illegal
wiretaps, what must it subsequently do in order to require testimony
of a grand jury witness who has been granted immunity?
In re Egan88 was the first decision to attempt to resolve this issue.
In that case Sister Joques Egan, a member of the Order of the Sacred
Heart, was called before a federal grand jury in connection with the
investigation into an alleged plot to kidnap a high public official and
surveillance of any kind of any conversations of the said MARK LAWRENCE ALTER at
any locations;
5. That I know the identity of all the sources of information upon which the
questioning of the said MARK LAWRENCE ALTER is based and no questions asked are
the result of electronic surveillance of the said MARK LAWRENCE ALTER.
/s/ROBERT A. DIERKER
Special Attorney
United States Department of Justice
Id. at 1027 n.17.
85. Id. at 1027 (citations omitted).
86. The Third and Fifth Circuits have criticized similar affidavits. In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468
(3d Cir. 1972); Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
87. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180-85 (1969).
88. 450 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1971), aff'dsub nom. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972)
[hereinafter referred to as Egan].
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other offenses. Immediately following her refusal to testify on fifth
amendment grounds, the government served her counsel with an ap-
plication for immunity.8 9 Appearing before the grand jury once again,
Sister Egan refused to testify on several grounds, one of which was
that the information which caused the government to subpoena her
and which prompted the questions propounded to her flowed from
illegal wiretapping and electronic surveillance. At no time did the
government deny the employment of wiretaps, nor did it claim that any
electronic surveillance that may have been utilized was authorized by
court order. The Third Circuit, therefore, assumed Sister Egan's alle-
gations to be true.
The Egan court opined that in pursuing investigations the gov-
ernment attempts to conduct surveillance within statutory and con-
stitutional limits; only in a slight number of cases does a violation of
the rules governing wiretapping occur. Thus, when the allegation of
illegal surveillance is made, in most cases the government will simply
represent to the court that no electronic surveillance has been em-
ployed by the government. In a lesser number of cases, the govern-
ment will produce in court the warrant by which it proceeded, and a
brief inquiry will demonstrate that the warrant was properly obtained
and that the surveillance did not exceed the authority of the warrant.
Only in a minimal number of cases will the court find that the
government conducted surveillance in violation of the statute, and in
these cases the hearings will not be overly complicated or lengthy. In
such instances the primary matter of inquiry would be: "[W]hether the
Government can demonstrate an independent basis, aside from the
illegal surveillance, upon which to justify the questions propounded
before the grand jury." 90
The Egan court made clear that, despite any disruption of the
proceedings, the mere possibility that some grand jury witnesses may
seek Alderman hearings 9 1-to determine whether the alleged surveil-
lance occurred and was illegal-is not sufficient to cause a curtailment
of an important right such as provided by the fourth amendment. As
the Supreme Court stated in Wong Sun v. United States,92 the ques-
tion is:
[W]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality,
the evidence to which instant objection is made has been
come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.
89. Pursuant to the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1970). The
court granted the application for immunity under section 6003 and Sister Egan was directed to be
available for examination. However, contrary to the court's instruction, and in direct reversal of
the government's announced intention, Sister Egan was not called before the grand jury. Instead,
the government served her counsel with an application for a grant of "transactional immunity"
under 18 U.S.C. section 2514, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
90. In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 216 (3d Cir. 1971).
91. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
92. 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX
As Justice Day stated in Weeks v. United States:9 3
The effect of the 4th Amendment is to put the courts of
the United States and Federal officials, in the exercise of their
power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to
the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever
secure the people, their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against all unreasonable searches and seizures under the guise
of law ...
If letters and private documents can thus be seized . ..
the protection of the fourth amendment declaring his right to
be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well
be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice
of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.
The Egan court concluded by stating that the very existence of a
government of laws will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law
scrupulously.
For the Government teaches the whole people by its example,
and if the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds
contempt for law. To declare that the Government may
commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of a criminal
may well bring unfortunate retribution.
94
In In re Testa, 95 a grand jury witness contended that he could not
be held in civil contempt for his failure to respond to questions which
were based, in part, upon illegal wiretaps maintained by the govern-
ment. The government admitted that it had employed a number of
illegal wiretaps. Quoting Egan, the court held that once the govern-
ment admitted the existence of illegal wiretaps, it must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence "an independent basis, aside from the
illegal surveillance, upon which to justify the questions propounded
before the grand jury."
'96
In order to establish an "independent basis," the government
introduced into evidence more recent legal surveillance reports of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and claimed that these documents
were the basis of the questions. 97 The government attorney in charge
93. 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914).
94. In re Egan, 450 F.2d 199, 217 (3d Cir. 1971).
95. 486 F.2d 1013 (3d Cir. 1973).
96. Id. at 1016.
97. Most of these surveillances took place in 1972 and 1973-the time period in which the
events in question involving the witness occurred-and were physical sightings of the witness'
meeting with various individuals.
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of the grand jury investigation also testified that he had not read the
logs of the illegal wiretaps; therefore, the logs had no effect on the
questions asked the witness. The court held that such evidence was
sufficient to find that the government had met its burden and had
established an "independent basis, apart from the illegal surveillance,"
for the questions asked. 9 8 In so holding, the court rejected the witness'
contention that the "independent basis" was tainted by the illegal
wiretaps. It reasoned that the likelihood that the questions were
tainted by the illegal taps was small; any taint which might have
existed -was in all likelihood sufficiently attenuated; therefore, the
possibility that the FBI agents used the illegal material did not persua-
sively refute the government's evidence. 9 9
Under certain circumstances, however, even if the government
fails to establish an "independent basis," a witness may be precluded
from raising the defense that the questions asked were based upon
improperly authorized electronic surveillance. 10 0
The witness in In re Marcus'0 1 was held in civil contempt for
refusal to answer questions propounded to him before a grand jury
following a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 2514. He
defended on the ground that an improperly authorized electronic sur-
veillance formed the basis of the questions asked. The alleged impro-
priety was lack of initial authorization by the Attorney General, or a
specially designated Assistant Attorney General, 102 the so-called Will
98. While the court found that the district court's evidentiary determination was correct and
affirmed on that basis, it also noted that 18 U.S.C. section 3504, enacted as part of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, had application to the factual situation presented. The statute
provides:
(a) In any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court, grand jury,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United States-
(3) no claim shall be considered that evidence of such an event is inadmissible on the
ground that such evidence was obtained by the exploitation of an unlawful act occurring
prior to June 19, 1968, if such event occurred more than five years after such allegedly
unlawful act.
In this case the illegal surveillance ended in July, 1965, and the interrogation of the witness related
to 1972 and 1973 events. This being the case, the statute operated to preclude the claim of
inadmissibility.
However, constitutional questions may be involved in the application of this section. See
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972); In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1248 n.32 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
99. In so reasoning the court relied upon the statement of the Supreme Court in Nardone v.
United States:
Sophisticated argument may prove a causal connection between information obtained
through illicit wire-tapping and the Government's proof. As a matter of good sense,
however, such connection may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) (emphasis added).
In In re Testa, only the possibility of a causal connection between the illegal taps and the
questions had been demonstrated. Moreover, all of the questions asked related to specific events
which occurred in 1972 and 1973, the period of time in which most of the legal surveillance of the
witness relied on by the government took place. The illegal taps, by contrast, ended in 1965.
100. In re Marcus, 491 F.2d 901 (1st Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 94
S. Ct. 3064 (1974).
101. Id. [hereinafter referred to as Marcus].
102. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
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Wilson defect. 103 The government conceded that this case involved a
Will Wilson defect, but took the position that the witness was pre-
cluded, in connection with grand jury proceedings, from relying upon
it. On the basis of the government concession, the court seemingly
found that the interception order was not in fact properly authorized
by the Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General, i0 4 but ruled
that this was irrelevant.
Under 18 U.S.C. section 2518(10)(a), there are three grounds
stated for suppressing testimony:
(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;
(ii) the order or authorization or approval under which it was
intercepted is insufficient on its face; or
(iii) the interception was not made in conformity with the
order of authorization or approval.
The Marcus court construed subsection (i) as "covering, broadly, all
common law or constitutional objections . . . but, since statutory
violations are embraced in the other sections, not statutory ones." 105
The court then held that the Will Wilson defect "is a purely statutory
violation and therefore is not within subsection (i).' 1 0 6 As to subsection
(ii), section 2518(4)(d) requires that the order state the identity of the
person authorizing the application for the surveillance; this procedure
had been followed to the court's satisfaction. 107 The Marcus court,
thus concluded that there was no facial defect in the surveillance
order.
It is apparent that if the government admits the existence of an
illegal wiretap it may, nevertheless, proceed with the interrogation of
the grand jury witness provided that it can demonstrate either: (1) an
independent basis, aside from the illegal surveillance, which purges
the taint of the illegal action; or (2) that the illegality does not fall
within the confines of 18 U.S.C. section 2518(10)(a), i.e., the com-
munication was lawfully intercepted, the authorizing order was
sufficient on its face, and the interception was made in conformity
with the authorization.
103. At the time that the decision in Marcus was announced, aspects of the Will Wilson
defects were pending before the Supreme Court. See United States v. Giordano, 94 S. Ct. 1820
(1974); United States v. Chavez, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974).
104. As provided in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1) (1970).
105. 491 F.2d at 903.
106. Id. at 904.
107. The order stated as follows:
Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . are authorized, pursuant to
application authorized by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of
the Department of Justice, the Honorable Wilson, who has been specially desig-
nated by the Attorney General of the United States, the Honorable John N. Mitchell, to
exercise the powers conferred on him by Section 2516 of Title 18, United States Code, to
[carry out the surveillance].
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C. The Government Denies
1. THE GOVERNMENT MERELY DENIES IN A LETTER
In In re Korman, 08 the government submitted to the court a
letter signed by the chief of the Organized Crime and Racketeering
Section of the Justice Department, on behalf of the Assistant Attorney
General. That letter firmly and unequivocally denied that the witnes-
ses who had been called before a grand jury had been electronically
monitored.
Although not alleged by the witnesses themselves, the question of
whether or not a court's' acquiescing in such a response met the test of
fundamental fairness was raised by the Korman court. ' 09 By acting on
its own initiative, the court pointed out that past decisions had not
dealt with this issue expressly and had not thereby indicated that they
would permit this form of response as a sufficient form of official
denial to meet the classic test of fundamental fairness. For example, in
Gelbard v. United States,110 Mr. Justice White in his concurring
opinion stated:
Of course, where the Government officially denies the fact of
electronic surveillance of the witness, the matter is at an end
and the witness must answer."'
However, this is not a statement relative to the sufficiency of the
government's response needed to characterize it as a "denial."
In In re Womack, 112 the government also filed a letter from the
Assistant Attorney General which made certain representations con-
cerning the lack of electronic surveillance. The Seventh Circuit held
that:
[T]he representations in this case by the Department of Jus-
tice that the privacy of neither relator was subject to interfer-
ence put "the matter . . . at an end and the witness[es] must
answer." 113
Yet it is evident that there was areafor consideration of whether
or not the Supreme Court has, in fact, accepted the type of letter
involved in Korman as a sufficient, official denial of wiretapping:
108. 351 F. Supp. 325 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973) [hereinafter
referred to as Korman].
109. The court questioned whether a letter submitted in this form and manner might offend
"the traditional concept of the right of confrontation by the accused of his accuser. That right
includes the right of cross-examination or the right in some fashion to go behind the ordinary
letter." Id. at 328.
110. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
111. Id. at 71.
112. 466 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1972).
113. Id. at 558. See also Fraser v. United States, 452 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971).
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Incisive characterization compels me to query whether or not
such a letter in the form and manner in which it is submitted
would in the opinion of the higher courts, were they clearly to
address themselves to it, offend the traditional concept of the
right of confrontation by the accused of his accuser. That
right includes the right of cross-examination or the right to in
some fashion go behind an ordinary letter. The right of
confrontation seems yet in want of attention with relation to
the sufficiency of the Government's check upon itself.'"'
Whether the letter of denial by the Department of Justice was
sufficient to put a witness' allegations of electronic surveillance to an
end and to foreclose the necessity of additional affirmative action by
the government was resolved by the Seventh Circuit in the Korman
appeal.11 5 Paraphrasing the language of the lower court, the Seventh
Circuit admitted that its past decisions had deemed such letters of
denial sufficient as a disclaimer of governmental intervention by elec-
tronic means.
Yet, subsequent to these decisions, certain indiscretions
have been revealed concerning illegal electronic surveillance
which seem to militate for a more formal and bindifig
denial .... 116
The court, therefore, held that an official governmental denial of
electronic surveillance must, at the very least, be submitted in the
form of an affidavit by a responsible government official.
2. THE GOVERNMENT SUBMITS AFFIDAVITS
In addition to the Seventh Circuit, various courts have considered
the adequacy of an affidavit of denial in similar cases. That an
affidavit is the proper form of official denial has also found support in
the First Circuit,"' 7 the Third Circuit, 118 the Fifth Circuit,'' 9 and the
Ninth Circuit. '
2 0
In In re Grumbles, 121 the government gave the following assur-
ance:
[W]e are prepared to assure your Honor . . . that neither of
these witnesses has [sic] the subject of any electronic surveil-
lance within the knowledge of the United States government,
nor have any premises over which they have any proprietary
interest been the subject of any electronic surveillance, and
they have not been overheard in any way at any time in
114. In re Korman, 351 F. Supp. 325, 328 (N.D. Ill. 1972), aff'd, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir.
1973).
115. Korman v. United States, 486 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1973).
116. Id. at 931.
117. United States v. Doe, 451 F.2d 466 (1st Cir. 1971).
118. In re Grumbles, 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971).
119. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1972).
120. United States v. Fitch, 472 F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1973).
121. 453 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Grumbles].
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electronic surveillances, either legal or illegal, within the
knowledge of the United States government. 122
The government volunteered to make this statement under oath, but
the district court considered this procedure unnecessary without an
objection by counsel for the witnesses. However, at the suggestion of
the Third Circuit, an affidavit was filed with the district court, para-
graph seven of which stated:
I reassert on the basis of information and belief that a
review of the records of the Department of Justice reveals
that Donald Bruce Grumbles and Patricia Catherine Grum-
bles were never the subjects of direct electronic surveillance
nor were any of their conversations monitored by any elec-
tronic device to the knowledge of any Federal agency, nor
has there been electronic surveillance on premises which were
known to have been owned, leased, or licensed by them.'1
3
The court held that the government had made a sufficient show-
ing that the questioning of the witnesses was not the product of an
electronic surveillance proscribed by the Constitution and 18 U.S.C.
section 2515. As indicated above, the government had assured the
district court that neither of the witnesses nor any of the premises in
which they had any proprietary interest had been the subject of any
electronic surveillance, legal or illegal; this assurance had been restated
in affidavit form. The witnesses had failed to present any evidence
demonstrating that these representations made by the government
were false.
The issue raised by a witness in In re Horn2 4 was whether a
witness who refused to testify on the basis that the questioning rep-
resented the product of unlawful wiretapping or electronic surveillance
was entitled to an evidentiary hearing. The court, citing Grumbles,
held that when a witness files a petition to suppress pursuant to 18
U.S.C. section 2518(10)(a),12 5 the government, though obligated to
affirm or deny the occurrence of the unlawful act, 126 may do so by
affidavit. If the affidavit is sufficient on its face and nothing is offered
to indicate that the affidavit is false or defective, the trial court has the
power to deny the witness' petition.
Although the decision in Grumbles certainly did not foreclose
holding an evidentiary hearing where appropriate, that case held that
since the witnesses had not presented "any evidence demonstrating
that these representations by the Government [were] false,"'1 27 a hear-
ing was not warranted.
122. Id. at 120.
123. Id. at 120 n.4.
124. 458 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972).
125. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a) (1970), there are three grounds stated for suppressing
testimony. These are quoted in note 13 supra. See also section IV, B infra.
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(1) (1973).
127. 453 F.2d at 122.
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It would be desirable for the government's affidavits to contain
more complete statements setting forth whether there had been any
wiretapping or electronic surveillance including that which the gov-
ernment had considered to be legal. Furthermore, the caseload of
questions involving electronic surveillance would be greatly reduced if
the government were to indicate with some specificity which "appro-
priate agencies" were in fact contacted to determine whether surveil-
lance had been employed. 128
3. IS THE WITNESS ENTITLED TO A HEARING EVEN IF THE
GOVERNMENT DENIES BY AFFIDAVIT?
Does a witness, while defending a civil contempt action brought
against him for refusing to answer a grand jury question derived from
electronic surveillance, have a right to litigate the legality of that
surveillance?
Chapter 119 of Title 18 of the United States Code, entitled "Wire
Interception and Interception of Oral Communications" (18 U.S.C.
sections 2510-20), represents an assiduous congressional effort to bal-
ance the individual's right to privacy against the government's legiti-
mate interest in gathering information necessary for the prosecution of
crimes.' 29 Integral to the statutory scheme are elaborate precautions
prescribed to insure that electronic surveillance is not used unnecessar-
ily and that when it must be used its duration is narrowly cir-
cumscribed. To maximize compliance with the provisions of chapter
119 by investigative authorities who desire to employ wiretaps and
other electronic devices, the chapter contains its own "exclusionary
rule" which provides:
Whenever any wire or oral communication has been
intercepted, no part of the contents of such communication
and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evi-
dence in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before
any court, grand jury, department, officer, agency, regula-
tory body, legislative committee, or other authority of the
United States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof if the
disclosure of that information would be in violation of this
chapter. 130
The apparently ample breadth of this proscription has been
confirmed by Gelbard. 131 However, the Gelbard court left undecided
the issue of whether a witness may refuse to answer questions if the
128. In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1972).
129. The striking of this balance is achieved primarily through the statutory provisions
requiring the Government to obtain a court order authorizing the electronic intercep-
tion. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(1)(a), 2516(1) [(1970)]. As might be expected, the statute
also contains some express exceptions to this general mandate. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2511(3), 2518(7) [(1970)].
In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1159 n.2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1554 (1974).
130. 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1970).
131. 408 U.S. 41 (1972).
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interception of conversations were pursuant to court order. This issue
emerged in In re Persico. 132 In that case it was urged that the mere
existence of a court order should not preclude the witness from fully
litigating in the contempt proceeding the lawfulness of the surveil-
lance.
In rejecting a witness' right to an evidentiary hearing, the Persico
court relied heavily upon the concurring opinion of Justice White in
Gelbard.
In that opinion he intimated . . . that when, during grand
jury proceedings, the Government does produce a court order
the traditional notion that the functioning of the grand jury
system should not be impeded or interrupted could prevail at
that time over the witness's interest in exploring in depth the
validity of the surveillance.
"Where the Government produces a court order for the
interception, however, and the witness nevertheless demands
a full-blown suppression hearing to determine the legality of
the order, there may be room for striking a different accom-
modation between the due functioning of the grand jury
system and the federal wiretap statute. Suppression hearings
in these circumstances would result in protracted interruption
of grand jury proceedings. At the same time, prosecutors and
other officers who have been granted and relied on a court
order for the interception would be subject to no liability
under the statute, whether the order is valid or not; and in
any event, the deterrent value of excluding the evidence will
be marginal at best."'
1 33
Congressional concern over disruption of the operation of the
grand jury system is also found in the legislative history of chapter
119. Senate Report No. 1097134 appears tW controvert a witness' con-
tention that, in defending a contempt proceeding resulting from his
refusal to answer a question before the grand jury, he is entitled to a
suppression hearing.
Paragraph (10)(a) provides that any aggrieved persons,
as defined in section 2510(11), discussed above, in any trial
hearing or other proceeding in or before any court depart-
ment, officer, agency, regulating body or other authority of
the United States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State
may make a motion to suppress the contents of any inter-
cepted wire or oral communication or evidence derived there-
from.
This provision must be read in connection with sections 2515
and 2517, discussed above, which it limits. It provides the
132. 491 F.2d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 1554 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Persico].
133. Id. at 1160, quoting Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 70 (1972) (White, J.,
concurring).
134. S. REp. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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remedy for the right created by section 2515. Because no
person is a party as such to a grand jury proceeding, the
provision does not envision the making of a motion to sup-
press in the context of such a proceeding itself. Normally,
there is no limitation on the character of evidence that may
be presented to a grand jury, which is enforceable by an
individual. (Blue v. United States, [United States v. Blue] 86
S. Ct. 1416, 384 U.S. 251 [16 L.Ed.2d 510] (1965).) There is
no intent to change this general rule. It is the intent of the
provision only that when a motion to suppress is granted in
another context, its scope may include use in a future grand
jury proceeding. '35
Though Congress prescribed that illegal wiretap evidence must be
excluded from all grand jury proceedings, hearings to suppress evi-
dence were not to be permitted during such proceedings.
These seemingly inconsistent policy determinations can be
reconciled only by interpreting the statute as requiring exclu-
sion only when it is clear that a suppression hearing is un-
necessary, as when the Government concedes that the elec-
tronic surveillance was unlawful or when the invalidity of the
surveillance is patent, such as, for example, when no prior
court order was obtained, or when the unlawfulness of the
Government's surveillance has been established in a prior
judicial proceeding. 136
In these situations both statutory policies-the exclusion of illegally
acquired evidence and the maintenance of unimpeded grand jury
proceedings-are served. "But where illegality is claimed and, if estab-
lished, can be established only by way of a plenary suppression hear-
ing, one important aim of the legislation would be frustrated.'
3 7
However, despite the preceding analysis, the Persico court held
that, in contempt proceedings initiated when a witness who has been
granted "derivitive use" immunity refuses to answer questions pro-
pounded by a grand jury because he claims he is entitled to a hearing
to ascertain whether the questions posed are the product of unlawful
electronic surveillance, the witness is not entitled to a plenary suppres-
sion hearing to test the legality of that surveillance. The court further
held that the witness' refusal to answer would be permissible only if
there is an absence of a necessary court order, a concession from the
government that the surveillance was not in conformity with statutory
requirements or a prior judicial adjudication that the surveillance was
unlawful. In Persico there were three court orders. Inasmuch as the
judge conducted an in camera inspection to ascertain whether the
government had complied with the statute and found compliance, the
135. Id. at 2195 (emphasis added).
136. In re Persico, 491 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 1161-62.
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Second Circuit felt that the witness had received all that he was
entitled to receive.
The Ninth Circuit has followed the lead of the Second in denying
a witness the opportunity of a hearing. In In re Weir, 138 an affidavit
prepared by a Department of Justice attorney denied any electronic
surveillance. The attorney stated that all national security electronic
surveillance authorized by the Attorney General is conducted by the
FBI and that his inquiries of the FBI and other agencies which
conduct surveillance pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Streets Act of 1968 revealed that no surveillance
occurred. The Weir court held that the government's denial of surveil-
lance was adequate. "Proving a negative is, at best, difficult and. . . a
practical, as distinguished from a technical, approach is dictated."' 13 9
Judge Goodwin based his dissenting opinion in Weir, however, on
the fact that the questions propounded to the witness were based upon
statements obtained from Mexican authorities. It was uncontroverted
that these statements had been brutally obtained by Mexican soldiers
holding the witness' head under water until he gagged and lapsed into
unconsciousness, sticking knives into his legs, buttocks and neck,
beating him until he was unconscious, and hanging him from a tree
limb by a rope around his neck until he lost consciousness.
Judge Goodwin stated that nine months had elapsed between the
witness' first appearance before the grand jury and the contempt
adjudication. There was ample time for a hearing, which, it had been
estimated, would have taken no more than one day. A hearing could
easily have been held without disrupting the grand jury proceedings
any more than they already had been delayed by other circumstances.
The incremental delay which this hearing would have pro-
vided to the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand
jury's duties would seem a modest price to pay if in the final
result we could put an early end to the use of a coerced
confession in a federal court.140
The most recent pronouncement with regard to a grand jury
witness' right to a hearing is that of the First Circuit. The court in In
re Lochiatto'4 l noted that there is often sensitive material contained in
government reports and affidavits; there is a high premium placed on
secrecy, often to protect the witnesses; there is the practical necessity
of not unduly impeding grand jury proceedings. However, the First
Circuit concluded that, though an absolute requirement of total dis-
closure of guarded information could not have been the intent of
Congress, policy does not command a bar of any disclosure.
138. 495 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Weir].
139. Id. at 881.
140. Id. at 882 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
141. 497 F.2d 803 (1st Cir. 1974) [hereinafter referred to as Lochiatto].
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The Lochiatto court stated, "The triple objective, then, is to
minimize the delay, secure the government's interest, if any, in se-
crecy, and protect a defendant's right to assert the defenses Congress
established.' ' 142 Though it did not grant a witness the right to a
hearing, by balancing the three competing needs, the First Circuit
established certain ground rules. When a witness seeks to assert his
rights under 18 U.S.C. section 2515 and section 2518(10)(a), he should
be given an opportunity to inspect the authorized application of the
Attorney General or his designate, the affidavits in support of the court
order, the court order itself and any affidavit submitted by the gov-
ernment indicating the length of the surveillance.
The Lochiatto decision does not require that the witness be pro-
vided with any evidence for the purpose of litigating the truth of
statements made by affiants. If the government interposes an objection
on secrecy grounds, the district court must determine whether the
information can be successfully deleted or summarized and whether
access to the excerpted material should be granted. However, if the
judge determines that so much of the material is sensitive and that
revelation of any of it would prejudice the government, he must
review it in camera to determine the constitutional and statutory
validity of the application and the court order based on the warrants
and the compliance by the government with statutory minimization
requirements.
V. CONCLUSION-A PLENARY HEARING IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED
There is no doubt that an alleged contemnor may raise the defense
of illegal electronic surveillance when the government seeks to have
him adjudicated in contempt. 143 It is equally clear that he may also
raise the illegal surveillance of his attorney under appropriate
circumstances. 144 In addition, the overwhelming majority view is that
to make a sufficient denial of any illegal act, the government must
submit at least an appropriate affidavit. 145 However, the question of
whether the alleged contemnor is entitled to a hearing is, as yet,
unresolved. Those few courts which have broached the subject have
stopped short of permitting a plenary suppression hearing. 146 Conceiv-
ably, both the fourth and fifth amendments provide a constitutional
basis for an alleged contemnor to demand a plenary hearing. 147
142. Id. at 807.
143. See section II supra.
144. See section III, A supra.
145. See section IV, C supra.
146. Id.
147. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
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The exclusionary rule formulated in Weeks v. United States14 8 and
Mapp v. Ohio14 9 prohibits the introduction of evidence seized from a
criminal defendant in violation of his fourth amendment rights. Fruits
of such evidence are excluded as well. 150 Because that amendment
now affords protection against the uninvited ear, illegally overheard
oral statements and their fruits are also subject to suppression."15
Moreover, there is now a comprehensive statute making unauthorized
electronic surveillance a serious crime.' 52 The reasons for this exten-
sive protection of fourth amendment rights are equally applicable to
grand jury witnesses. The security of persons and property remains a
fundamental value which law enforcement officers must respect: "Nor
should those who flout the rules escape unscathed.'
53
There is no doubt that when an illegal search has been discov-
ered, the government has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show
that its evidence is untainted. But, at the same time, alleged contem-
nors must go forward with specific evidence demonstrating taint.
[T]he trial judge must give opportunity, however closely
confined, to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of
the case against him was a fruit of a poisonous tree. This
leaves ample opportunity to the Government to convince the
trial court that its proof has an independent origin.'
54
The shifting of these burdens between the parties demonstrates
that adversary proceedings are a major aspect of our system of crimi-
nal justice.
Their superiority as a means for attaining justice in a given
case is nowhere more evident than in those cases, such as the
ones at bar, where an issue must be decided on the basis of a
large volume of factual materials, and after consideration of
the many and subtle interrelationships which must exist
among the facts reflected by these records. As the need for
adversary inquiry is increased by the complexity of the issues
presented for adjudication, and by the consequent inade-
quacy of ex parte procedures as a means for their accurate
U.S. CONST. amend. V provides: "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law ...."
148. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
149. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
150. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920).
151. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961).
152. Title Ill, Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-18
(1970). Not only does the Act impose criminal penalties upon those who violate its provisions
governing eavesdropping and wiretapping, but it also authorizes the recovery of civil damages by
a person whose wire or oral communication is intercepted, disclosed, or used in violation of the
Act. Punitive damages are recoverable, as well as a reasonable attorneys' fee and other costs of
litigation reasonably incurred.
153. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969).
154. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
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resolution, the displacement of well-informed advocacy
necessarily becomes less justifiable. 5'
There is no magical solution to be found in the use of adversary
proceedings. They will not eliminate all error; however, they will
substantially reduce its incidence by guarding against the possibility
that the trial judge, through lack of time or unfamiliarity with the
information contained in and suggested by the materials, will be
unable to provide the scrutiny which the fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule demands. The government may be compelled by the prospect
of disclosure to dismiss some prosecutions in deference to national
security or third-party interests. Nevertheless, this is a choice faced by
the government with respect to illegally obtained material which is
arguably relevant to the evidence offered.156
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforce-
ment the support of the usual inferences which reasonable
men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in
the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime ....
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is . . . a
grave concern, not only to the individual, but to a society
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom
from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a
judicial officer, not by a policeman or Government enforce-
ment agent. 1
57
The dictates of the fourth amendment, standing alone, mandate
that an alleged contemnor be afforded a plenary hearing. However, a
second Constitutional source in support of the contention that a ple-
nary hearing be provided is the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.
Failure to afford the alleged contemnor an opportunity to litigate
the issue of the illegality of any wiretap has the effect of denying due
process of law. It is abundantly clear that the witness is faced with a
grievous loss, that of his personal liberty, thus satisfying the threshold
standard promulgated for the application of due process by the Su-
preme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer:
158
Whether any procedural protections are due depends on the
extent to which an individual will be "condemned to suffer a
grievous loss." The question is not merely the "weight" of the
155. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 184 (1969).
156. Id.
157. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
158. 408 U.S. 471 (1972) [hereinafter referred to as Morrissey].
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individual's interest, but whether the nature of the interest is
one within the contemplation of the "liberty or property"
language [of the due process clause].' 5 9
Once the Morrissey test is met, the question then becomes what
process is due? "The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the
opportunity to be heard. The hearing must be at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner.' 60 Goldberg v. Kelly recognizes that the
hearing must afford the individual an effective "opportunity to con-
front and cross-examine adverse witnesses . "... ,,61 This view was
reiterated by the Supreme Court in Morrissey, in a parole revocation
proceeding where it was held that due process necessarily includes the
"right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses."' 62 Another
essential element is that the ultimate determination be made by an
impartial decision maker.
The opportunity to confront adverse witnesses and the presence of
an impartial decision maker are equally applicable to a contempt
proceeding under section 1826(a). Neither a parole revocation proceed-
ing nor a section 1826(a) contempt proceeding is denominated by
statute as applying to purely criminal proceedings. Both, however,
involve the loss of an individual's liberty, the "grievous loss" contem-
plated by the due process clause. The Ninth Circuit, in Alter, recog-
nized the hybrid quality of section 1826(a) proceedings. The labels
"civil" and "criminal" are not "immutable legal compartments, forever
hermetically sealed from each other, embodying mutually exclusive
procedural and constitutional rules. 1 63 The court held that where the
alleged contemnor makes a substantial claim of illegal wiretapping, he
is entitled to an uninhibited adversary hearing. It rejected as inconsis-
tent with due process a proceeding "confined to the perfunctory recep-
tion of affidavits, a round of oral argument and some offers for the
record. "16
4
The position espoused in Alter is entirely consistent with the due
process requirements of Morrissey and Goldberg. The view that the
mere denial by the government of illegal electronic surveillance puts an
end to the inquiry is totally inconsistent with all principles of due
process. Morrissey and Goldberg require an opportunity to confront
adverse witnesses and the presence of an impartial decision maker. In
all of man's experience and utilizing all of his wisdom, there remains
no way to confront or cross-examine a piece of paper. Of equal
importance is the fact that when this piece of paper is presented by the
159. Id. at 481.
160. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970).
161. Id. at 269 [hereinafter referred to as Goldberg].
162. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
163. United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1973).
164. Id. at 1024.
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government, and held ipso facto conclusive as to the factual issues
involved, there is no impartial decision maker, The only way that
section 8504(a)(1), as it deals with the government's denial of illegal
activity, can be construed to be consistent with due process is to afford
the alleged contemnor a full hearing as to the legality of the wiretap.
